Tuesday, March 13, 2012

And the Public Wakes Up to the Deadway in Boston

In today’s Boston Herald article, “Greenway Conservancy critics have their say” the public has finally reached the conclusion that many of my posts have addressed. The Greenway is, relative to its cost and promise, a complete failure because of Mayor Menino and the restrictions that have choked the project. The ridiculous spending of the Conservatory is a symptom of what happens when nothing happens. “Overseers” claim that they need to “oversee” because the park isn’t successful. And it never ends.


The Greenway is the Deadway, and the game’s up on everyone involved. I served on the Surface Artery Commission of the State Legislature for two years before the Greenway opened. The State legislation designated that the Greenway be used for public use—not open parkland—public use. Of course, every environmental, preservation-minded person on the panel took that to mean empty parkland. And so we have what we limited ourselves to—a seldom-visited, chopped up series of miniature parks that nobody walks through.

I will put it simply. There is nothing to do on the Greenway, and it is not located in a spot where people would naturally congregate, i.e. the Common, Copley Square, City Hall Plaza. It is a circuitous path around the perimeter of the city, lined by buildings on both sides. Given the choice on a winter night of the choice to walk from Federal Street to North Station, nobody will decide that it would be more aesthetically pleasing to add 20 minutes to the trip by heading east and walking in an empty circle. People head in straight lines.

The solution is simple. First, charge fees to the current beneficiaries of the Greenway, the property owners along its path. They will object. They will fight. But if you make the fee reasonable, then you can beat them through public opinion. I can see an article in the Globe now: “Boston Harbor Hotel, city’s most expensive, refuses to participate in Greenway partner project.” And make life miserable without cooperation.

Second, get rid of the notion that big and tall is bad and let new construction take place, the return on which would justify a developer undertaking the project. And yes, Mr. Mayor, that means height. Every approved project would carry with it a pre-construction covenant of payment to maintain the Greenway. This is done in San Francisco at Yerba Buena Park and has encouraged new development –developers will gladly pay to build on an amenity. And, to address a primary purpose of the Greenway, assure that the developments incorporate a connection to the harbor. And I do not, in any way, mean height limits. We are afraid of tall buildings. Visit the waterfront of Sydney and tell me whether tall buildings and 24/7 vibrancy can coexist.

Those two financial assessments alleviate the maintenance of the park. Goodbye Conservancy, goodbye to public funding. But they don’t address the core issue of making the Greenway a place people want to go.

Let the private sector build on the Greenway. I know this will shock everybody at the BRA because I think they actually enjoy reviewing and encouraging nonsensical non-profit proposals (YMCA, Mass. Audubon, Museum of History, etc.) Each parcel can structurally bear significant buildings. Allow private developers to create public spaces. They would not necessarily be free to the public but they would be designed to bring anyone into the project as opposed to office towers or residential buildings.

Let Apple build one of its glowing iconic stores. Let the BSO build a magnificent opera house, raised above Dewey Square. Let the Bruins and the Jacobs Brothers build a remarkable hockey rink near the Garden. The developers’ costs will not be recovered by charges. The expenditures will not be recaptured and categorized as advertising. And not impermanent billboards or flashing signs but physical spectacular advertising they could develop, all in the name of the public good. I can see the blimp view of the Greenway during a Pats game now—alive and creative.

Let imaginations run wild for once rather than be dismissed by restrictive rules that have utterly failed. I don’t have the answers for how the private sector will react and what they will propose. But they will respond and it will be exciting. Otherwise, we’re struck with the Dimway, bleeding money.

Friday, February 3, 2012

Millennium, Filene’s and the Skeletons in the Closet

Millennium, Filene’s and the Skeletons in the Closet


Let me begin with a quote from the New York Time in which Tony Pangaro, Boston Principal for Millennium Partners, discusses Hayward Place in Boston. Please note the date: “‘We think we can build this summer after two years when we couldn’t,’ said Anthony Pangaro, a principal of Millennium Partners-Boston, which has previously developed luxury condominiums downtown. This month Millennium’s $200 million Hayward Place project in the theater district sought city approval to convert from 200 condominiums to 265 units, mostly rentals.” (NY Times, February, 2011).

Well, obviously that didn’t happen, given that the official groundbreaking was November 15, 2011. Yes, the mayor had his shovel out. Of course, he also misled the public in June 2011 by announcing that construction would begin in 2 weeks.

Yesterday, referring to the Filene’s site and Vornado, Vornado announced it “has reached a deal to team up with a local developer to jump start the stalled project.” (Boston Business Journal, 2/2/2012.) First of all, Millennium is not a local developer. They began in NYC, have most of their holdings there, and are headquartered there. Their website opens with a camera scanning the New York skyline. The only thing missing is a Giants logo.

Millennium did not buy the Filene’s site. They have an undefined “deal” with Steve Roth. The problem is that there has been no movement in the condition of the intended market for the site for which Vornado overpaid to the tune of $100 million. The rent the target market of users for space within a 1.2 million square foot tower are willing to pay is not high enough to generate a sufficient return on Roth’s investment.

The rough cost of developing the property (land cost + construction costs) will be roughly $500 million, according to Millennium. On a per square foot basis, the development cost would be roughly $420.00. Developers demand high rates of return for new construction because of the high risk involved. Let’s use 20% as a desired return. Let’s take the case of a potential office user. In order to meet any developer’s acceptable rate of return, an office user would have to pay roughly $110 per square foot in rent (20% of $420 + $25.00 in tax and operating expenses.) The average market rent in Boston for Class A space today is $50.00. The highest priced space is $70.00. The latter are in premier office towers in premier locations—111 Huntington Avenue, International Place, the Hancock Tower, 75 State Street—not in the middle of Downtown Crossing. Of course, the project has other components—retail and residential—but the market is still not at an acceptable rate of return. Perhaps I am underestimating the residential component but full plans have not been presented. And achievable residential sale prices do not currently fit what the cost structure seems to be at Filene’s.

Millennium cannot change the market. They bring Boston expertise to the project, but there is an awfully big skeleton in their closet and it is only 2 blocks away.

The Mayor has spent about 2 years blasting Vornado after, with full permits in hand, they legally demolished a significant part of the former Filene’s, the first step of construction and not inexpensive. When rents in the market dropped and sources of financing dried up during the recession, Vornado put the project on hold. Menino has been enraged ever since.

Let’s look at the Filene’s timeline.

1. November 2007: City grants full permit to Vornado for demolition and construction of 1 million square foot mixed use project.

2. Summer 2008 to November 2008: Demolition completed.

3. November 2008 to present: No further construction.

4. February 2012: Announce “deal” with Millennium.



Now let’s get to the skeleton in Millennium’s closet. It’s called Hayward Place. It’s been and still is a shabby parking lot on lower Washington Street facing the Paramount Theater and the Millennium-built Ritz-Carlton Hotel and Towers. The city owned the property and put it out to bid for residential development in in April 2001.

By July 2001, eight developers had submitted proposals. The bids included, as required, both project designs and price offers. All but Millennium proposed housing, in combination with other uses such as school, retail, and office. The high bidder, at $23 million, was Lincoln Property Co, in a joint venture with Equity Residential Company. Millennium bid $20.5 million. The high bidder was not awarded the site for development.

And then the “irregularities” occurred. For reasons never explained, rather than selling to the highest bidder meeting the original requirements, the BRA invited the other short-listed developers, including Millennium, to match Lincoln’s high bid. They then awarded the designation to Millennium as the developer for Hayward Place. The BRA’s reasoning for blatantly changing the requirements of the bidding process to make sure Millennium got the project were feeble. In its summary of the “bidding”, the BRA stated that the choice of office rather than housing use was explained as due to an oversupply of housing in the area. The BRA also stated that it chose this proposal for the “vitality” to be created by an office building. And, then, just for the heck of it, in June 2003, the city allowed Millennium to lease rather than purchase the land, an opportunity not granted in the original bidding or subsequent bidding.

What really happened? Lincoln Properties and Equity Residential, a combined entity with far more capital and experience than Millennium, outbid Millennium. This disappointed the Mayor. So the BRA changed the selection criteria to favor office and gave the designation to Millennium. And, after all these years, what is Millennium building on the site? You guessed right—residential. That’s the same Millennium that’s part of the new Filene’s team.

The Hayward deal was manipulated and everyone in the market knew it. As bad as that is, let’s look at the Hayward timeline and compare it to the Vornado timeline.

January 2001: Millennium designated to develop project.

November 2011: Millennium holds groundbreaking.

From 2003 to present: Millennium collects substantial parking revenue, effectively making their holding cost zero.



So let’s see. Vornado buys the Filene’s site in a private transaction for $100 million. Millennium buys the Hayward site from the city by way of a politically manipulated bidding process for $23 million.



Vornado receives development approval in November 2007, begins and finishes demolition work in November 2008, and puts further construction on hold. Time between last activity on site and today: 3 years, 2 months.



Millennium receives development approval on January 2003 and does nothing until it holds a groundbreaking on November 15, 2011. Time between last activity on site and next action: 13 years, 11 months.



The Mayor has never uttered a peep about Millennium’s failure to move forward on its eyesore. Millennium’s reasons, when given, for not moving forward match those of Vornado, namely that market pricing is not high enough to justify development and financing is not available. The Mayor never vilifies the principals of Millennium as he does with Vornado. The Mayor doesn’t call the Mayor of New York to urge him to make Millennium to build, as he did in a plea to have Vornado build.



And now, we have a team. Millennium sat on a project in the neighborhood for nearly 14 years and received no criticism. Vornado did the same for 3 years and he has been held up as the real estate devil incarnate.



I want to see development at both the Filene’s site and at Hayward Place. I don’t see how adding Millennium to the team assures this given its own hole in the ground. I hope they prove me wrong.

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

Help, I’m Sinking in a Think Tank and I Can’t Get Out

Help, I’m Sinking in a Think Tank and I Can’t Get Out




Today, the Beacon Hill Institute issued a report entitled “Massachusetts Real Estate Licensing Requirements Benefit Agents Not Consumers.” The Boston Business Journal and Banker & Tradesman ran the article as their lead columns on line.



The research article was written by Benjamin Powell, Ph.D., an Associate Professor of Economics at Suffolk University and a Senior Economist with the Beacon Hill Institute, and Evgeny Vorotnikov, Ph.D., a Post‐Doc Research Fellow at the University of Minnesota and Tuerck Foundation



In short, the writers argue that requiring brokers to take 12 hours of continuing education courses every 2 years at a cost of $100 is a) driving brokers out of the industry; b) increasing the average incomes of those remaining; and c) having no impact on claims filed against brokers at the Mass. Division of Licensure.



They have fallen victim to the trap of coincidence and effect. This fallacy was recognized in Ancient Greece and simply states that correlation does not imply causation. The opposite belief, correlation proves causation, is logical fallacy by which two events that occur together are claimed to have a cause-and-effect relationship. The fallacy is also known as cum hoc ergo propter hoc (Latin for "with this, therefore because of this") The writers even state in their report that “the cost, in terms of both time and money, of twelve hours of continuing education is unlikely to cause many full‐time realtors to exit the industry or to deter others from entering.” Not a single broker was interviewed in the article.



The requirement to take classes does not “cause” anything. The balance of their research is a measurement of coincidence, not causation. The writers use the legislation passage as the independent variable, even though they fail to establish cause, and use multivariate regression analysis to state that the legislation requiring continuing education was statistically significant in accounting a) fewer brokers, b) lower incomes, and c) lack of change in complaints against brokers. I could further critique their work for the paucity of additional dependent variables that should have been added to the list tested. But there really is not point when we are speaking coincidence, not correlation.



What is also amazing is that, at no point do the writers actually discuss the nature of the classes, and I would be willing to bet they attended none and have no knowledge of them. I have sat through 6 sessions to date. The purpose is education. There are six modules, each covering a different topic which enhances a broker’s skill sets and, above all, informs brokers of new rules and regulations affecting the profession, such as disposal of toxic waste; lender-broker relationships; and rules on the use of multiple listing services. The authors are trying to argue that obligating brokers to pay $100.00 every 2 years to bring themselves up to date should be abolished because it is too much of a burden for part time brokers. Would the writers like it to hear their doctors tell them they had not attended any industry events or training programs since receiving licenses to practice? How about their attorney? How about the pilot flying their plane?





The writers ran their statistical tests, the results of which emblazoned the papers. And yet they failed to establish any reasonable case for cause and effect. We all want to believe. That’s why we have rain dances and rub our rabbit’s feet. But, if the event occurs after we have danced or rubbed, it is a coincidence, nothing more.



The simple fact is that the requirement to take a licensing course every 2 years has no effect on the number of brokers, the income of brokers, and the number of complaints. Let me tell you what does have an effect on these three measurable facts.



1. Numbers of brokers: The number of brokers has been shrinking continuously and will continue to do so due to:

a. Real estate technology used not only in residential online “shopping” but as a single source of information for the massive commercial real estate brokerage industry. It is both a source of information and as a tool for market and financial analytics. The individual broker simply has more tools at hand which has led to a massive layoff of brokers. That has reduced the number of real estate brokers more profoundly than any other influence, and it will continue to do so. Think of Wall Street 30 years ago and today.

b. Brokerage industry consolidation has eliminated overlapping brokerages within geographic areas, decreasing the number of brokers necessary to cover a given area. The consolidation has also allowed brokers to draw on central office sophistication to further improve general skills or to develop necessary transaction documentation, allowing a standardized approach to the business, which again allows fewer brokers to do the work of one.

2. Broker Income:

a. The income of brokers has increased because there are fewer brokers for the reason state above, not because of the burden of licensing.

3. Complaints and Litigation:

a. The fact that the number of complaints has not materially changed is, once again, an instance of not understanding where the nature of complaints play out. Any broker knows that it is not at the Licensing Division. Most complaints against brokers fall under Chapter 93A of the consumer protection acts of Massachusetts through the Attorney General’s office. But there is a distinction between the complaints against a broker’s action and the actions of an incompetent broker. I would recommend the broker check the AG’s office for a true sample of complaints. I would suggest the writer’s might list as a “dummy” variable the number of houses in foreclosure and the statistical significance of the number of broker complaints.

b. What the writers fail to grasp is that the argument to end licensing requirements would lead to the real legal battles in real estate which involve contract law and, typically, the disagreement between the parties over the obligations of each party in the contract. Since brokers are the first step toward a contract, I think I would prefer a more-educated, licensed lawyer, with knowledge of changes in real estate law and regulation involved in a transaction. Of course, that would cost $100.00 every 2 years.

Thursday, January 26, 2012

A Quick Note about the “Benefits of lowering the capital gains tax.

The argument in favor of lowering the cap gains tax because, in the past, it has shown to result in an increase in government revenues, is faulty on its premise and in its time horizon.


First, there are a wide variety of reasons why someone sells a capital asset. I am not arguing that, in the past, IRS collections have gone up after a decrease in the rate. But it's not about capital generations, new jobs, and all the nonsense behind the arguments. It’s because, with a lower rate, the value of your asset went up in the moment, and you are more likely to sell, which sets off a higher rate of collections.

The problem, which most economists make, is that they fail to look beyond what happens after the first year as far as collections. They also fail to see that capital gains collections are subject to countless variables other than the tax rate, perhaps, above all, the stock market.

But talk is talk. Below are two tables showing the effect of two recent reductions in the cap gains tax rate. The first table shows the rate of increase or decrease in percentage terms in IRS cap tax collections. The other shows the change in GDP as a proxy for the multivariate elements that go into capital gains tax collections.



All changes to IRS revenue and GDP occur one year after the tax act.



Long term capital gains tax rate       GDP         IRS Collections

Previous      New   Year        Percentage Δ          Percentage Δ

                             1996                     4%                   4.5%

28%  20% passed in 1997                    5%                     4.4

in effect                 1998                     4%                     4.8

                             1999                      5%                    4.1

                              2000                     4%                     1.1

                              2001                      1%                    1.8

                              2002                     2%                    2.5

20%  15% passed in 2003                      3%                    3.5

in effect                  2004                      4%                      3.1

                              2005                       3%                      2.7

                               2006                     3%                       1.9

                              2007                     2%                       -0.3

                              2008                     -3%                       -3.5

                             2009                      -4%                        3.0

                             2010                       3%                          3%





Sources: Congressional Budget Office http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/Chapter4.shtml.



Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp



Consider years 1996, 1997, and 2003. There were no tax policy changes that went into effect in these years. And yet, the increases in each of these years are among the highest in the table. More importantly, look at the years AFTER the first year of the tax cut. The best example is the cut passed in 2003 and in effect in 2004. In 2004, collections did rise by 4.1%. Then look at the next four years—so much for the long-term impact of a one-time change in the capital tax rate.

Thursday, January 19, 2012

When the price you pay isn't the price you pay in Massachusetts

Seems like there’s been a surprise waiting for a few cellphone purchasers these days in Massachusetts. In the infinite wisdom and most-likely unconstitutional action of the Department of Revenue, when you purchase your next cell phone, you won’t pay tax on the price offered. No, you will pay on the “full wholesale price.” We all know that the purchase of a cellphone is a bundled purchase. The retailers give you a discount on the phone but it comes with an obligatory contract, on which your monthly service charge is heavily taxed by the state.


Seems like the Department of Revenue in a “Directive” dated April 29, 2011, forced the seller of a cellphone which included a bundled package of services, to tax the phone itself at “full wholesale value.” Of course, they did not define the wholesale value. The Department of Revenue basically argues that the price of an object or service sold is not the final sales price, even though the bundled service is taxable. Nothing like turning over a few centuries of the nature of sales and negotiations.

When I go to Macy’s and a sweater has been marked down 50%, with the original and reduced rate shown on the price tag, I have never been taxed on the higher price. Nor have I been forced to sign a contract to wear the sweater, paying Macy’s on a monthly basis. When I go to purchase a new car and the sales price invariably comes in below the original asking price, I have never been taxed on the original sales price. And, no, I don’t have to pay General Motors a monthly fee to drive the car. The world has been and is ruled by fair market price determined by the actual sales price at the point of transaction. Any further laws that specific transaction may set in motion, such as sales taxes or levies, should apply to the actual sales price.

The DOR directive is clearly in conflict with Mass. General Laws, Chapter 64H, “Tax on Retail Sales of Certain Tangible Personal Property”. In Section 1, paragraph 19, the “sales price” is defined by “the total amount paid by a purchaser to a vendor as consideration for a retail sale, valued in money or otherwise” with the clear stipulation in subparagraph c that “(c) there shall be excluded (i) cash discounts allowed and taken on sales.” These are the same cash discounts the state is now taxing.

To selectively apply an archaic and unenforced “full-retail tax policy” to cellphones alone is both random and dismisses the concept of tying taxes to sales prices. Inexplicably, the Globe endorsed this although, in reading the editorial, I really have no idea what they’re writing about. I guess in Massachusetts, the price is wrong.

Thursday, January 12, 2012

The Only Casino that will be built in Massachusetts

It’s nice that the Governor divided up the state into three regions for a casino. The problem is that nobody is attracted to Southeastern or Western Massachusetts if they are coming to gamble in a casino that meets the grand visions of all of us. Sorry, I don’t want to drive to Brimfield and play blackjack in a cornfield. And I don’t care if there are fifteen 5-star restaurants on the site. I don’t want to drive by abandoned warehouses and play roulette in the equivalent of Massachusetts’ Atlantic City in Fall River.


This leaves 2 options: Foxboro and Boston. I love the Pats, think the Kraft family has been an extraordinary citizen of the state, but I don’t want to drive down route 1 south, pass the 16 liquor stores and turn into a “world class” casino.

We are all forgetting one thing. A casino unto itself does not make the casino “world class” or even desirable. Casinos need access for very impatient customers and they need amenities unique to their location. Remember, we are not talking about 25 casinos along a strip in Las Vegas. Suffolk is a 10 minute van ride from Logan (not sure where the airport is in Brimfield). When your significant other wants to explore the neighborhood, I think he or she might prefer the 10 minute bus ride to Faneuil Hall than the footbridge adventure into Patriot Place. I truly have no idea where one goes if one goes outside at all in Fall River or Brimfield.

Do we want a world class casino? Then put it in a world class city. I can hear western Mass. complaining already. “We’ll depend on New England visitors!” No, not if there is a more exciting choice. Isn’t that what casinos are all about? Excitement. And nobody from Chicago’s flying in to gamble in Fall River. And no businessmen in Boston are going to drive 2 hours to hit the cornfields of Brimfield.

Further, once Suffolk is chosen, there will be no other casinos in the state. They can’t compete and they won’t compete. Look at what they’d be up against. Where would you go to play?

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

The Day the Product Broker Died

Today I reviewed the same 15 emails that I receive from the same 15 brokers every Wednesday. I’m sure I’ll do the same tomorrow. They are very nicely done. Some take you to lovely web sites which extol the values of the property. Some lead you to floor plans. All list 3 or 4 brokers ready and waiting to answer your call. The vacancy never changes.


Product brokerage is dead, and it is the entire landlord community that has allowed it. The typical broker feels that he is actually marketing and leasing a property if he or she does four things:

1. Stick a listing on CoStar.

2. Send the same lame email out weekly.

3. Present his or her client with a list culled from any responses to the above together with the classic and useless “tenants in the market.”

4. Wait for the phone to ring.

Product brokerage is a discipline that brokerage has given up on. The discipline is really quite simple but requires hard work. And the “big houses” don’t like hard work anymore as long as nobody demands hard work from them.

Product brokerage requires that a broker fully assess the attributes of the property-its location and neighboring submarket; the current tenant roster and why those tenants chose the property; its perceived class in the market—A, B, or premier; the reputation of ownership and management; all of its physical attributes from floor plate size to HVAC capacity.

From knowledge of the property attributes, a true product broker will match these against the tenants most likely to have an interest in the property. But a good broker can only do this if he or she maintains a detailed database of all tenants in the Boston market, appropriately categorized by submarket, lease expiration, preferred building quality, industry, and history of relocation, among other attributes, and the contacts at each firm.

Brokerage houses don’t have this information and that’s my challenge to the entire brokerage community. And my challenge to the entire landlord community. Tomorrow, ask your broker to provide you with his or her own list of the target tenants he or she is pursuing, EXCLUDING calls from CoStar, calls from emails, and the ubiquitous but useless “tenants in the market.” Your broker will not have a list. I guarantee it. They do not have demand side information that they have developed themselves. They may ask for a few hours but don’t give it to them.

Then the landlord community may just realize that, in their broker’s opinion, no matter how slick their latest email may be, or how fascinating their web site may appear, that you’re just another building with a “for lease” sign on it. Along with the other 10 buildings they’ve hung a shingle on.

Wouldn’t it be nice if brokers actually marketed your buildings?

Monday, October 3, 2011

Why urban Planning Fails--especially in Boston

The Boston Globe’s article “Urban Analysis” (Monday, October 3, 2011) is another self-indulgent look at what urban planners want to do and what urban planners can do. And none of it is new or cutting edge.


The Romans were perhaps the world’s most successful urban planners. Why—because Rome, at the height of its power, was an absolute dictatorship, with a Senate thrown in for good looks. It was a lot like Mayor Menino’s Boston with the City Council along for the ride. Urban planners hold tight to the belief that a good plan creates good development. The problem with that thinking is that there is a complete lack of recognition that land transfer and ownership in this country is private. Yes, government must and should control infrastructure and common land uses such as parks and recreation. But you can plan your heart away and if the CEO of a company doesn’t agree that point x generated by some type of Urban Network Analysis toolbox, the game’s up. Planners cannot execute.

And adding more and more data does not help. Nigel Jacob, in the Mayor’s office, who, by the way, needs to realize he works for a man who gives lip service to urban planning but absolute interest in Menino planning, needs to take a serious course in what is and is not “revolutionary” in urban planning. Nigel and the weekend data warriors should stop playing with numbers first and spend some time realizing they are not urban planning revolutionaries. Some suggestions: Ptolemy, Erastotshenes, Alexander von Humboldt, William Hunt Morris, and Robert Moses. Phone apps for removing graffiti and choosing great spots for bike racks is not exactly the stuff of revolution.

There is a fine line between setting a context for development and developing. Vornado and Filene’s come to mind. Ouch, that hurts. The planner and his toolbox are on the context side. Private capital, motivated by no set rules, is on the other. I have a good sense of this. I studied geography and economic development in college and have practiced commercial real estate for 29 years in Boston.

I must say I didn’t foresee “Occupy Boston” as a land use for the so-called Greenway. Was that in the plan?

Monday, March 28, 2011

When the law is not the law--destroying the New England fisheries

The Gloucester Times reported today that a long-standing Congressional mandate (1954) that 60% of tariffs on imported seafood were to be directed to fishing industry projects has been ignored virtually since it came into existence. Instead the monies have been "redirected" to the NOAA. How's that for gallows humor. The NOAA, which has been suffocating the local fishing industry with its everchanging regulations, has also been pocketing the money the industry needs to recapitalize and rejuvenate itself.

Oh yes, I guess I forgot one important thing. Over the past ten years, the diversion has only been $400 million. In 2009, the total tariff was $108 million. Under the law, $65 million should have been spent on the fishing industry. Instead, the total allotment was------ZERO.

But at least the NOAA has those sporty new SUV's they use to patrol Provincetown Harbor to make sure the 3 fishing boats docked in what was a thriving port aren't breaking the law by overfishing.

I wonder how our wonderful rice growers in Texas would respond to a similar "diversion." And then there's all those patriotic farmers growing corn for ethanol. I don't think they'd take this very well. But this is fishing where we seem determined to erase the last ship from our fishing ports.

Friday, March 18, 2011

Mutual Funds Still Drive the Boston Economy

Before we attack the largest industry employer in the city of Boston—the mutual funds industry—let’s remember that the tax breaks referenced in the recent decision of Fidelity to vacate its space in Marlboro were granted to all mutual fund companies. The mutual fund industry alone occupies over 35% of the Class A office market in Boston and vendors to the mutual fund industry are a major source of occupancy and employment as well. Mutual funds drive the Boston economy.


And the mutual fund industry in Boston is a proven success. We are not talking about subsidies and incentives to unproven or unstable industries. The Evergreen Solar debacle is the best example of the latter.

If we are going to provide tax breaks or subsidies at all, and I often question that wisdom, the least we can do is to make them available to all of the companies within a target industry. And we should begin by making sure we work with our successful industries first. The success of many other industries depends on the success of the core industry of a region.

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Massachusetts' Gateway Cities to Nowhere

Apparently, Massachusetts has 24 “Gateway Cities”, including Fitchburg, Pittsfield, and Springfield. As Gateways Cities, the State has spent hundreds of millions ($247 million on housing alone) to “revitalize these gateways. Which begs the question: gateways to what?


We need to accept the fact that some cities will never recover their former standing whether as industrial centers, mill towns, or fishing ports regardless of how much taxpayer money is spent attempting to do so. Over time, functions of all cities change relative to each other. Springfield was founded as an armory because British ships could not navigate up the Connecticut River. While its role as a major maker of munitions did lead to a thriving small machine tool industrial town, it has been on the decline for decades. No amount of money is going to bring Springfield back, and I emphasize back, to its past heydays. And there is really no functional objective that Springfield currently offers locationally that justifies continued subsidies.

Fitchburg was one of the nation’s leading centers of furniture production. I need say no more.

Perhaps some of the Massachusetts “Gateway Cities” have futures in a new economy. But spending millions of dollars on imaginary revitalization is an exercise in fantasy, an invitation to patronage, and an enormous waste of capital in a state whose trains don’t run on times and whose school systems are crumbling.

If we are going to put money into true growth cities, we should put it into those cities that are currently successful and thriving. This may sound counterintuitive but it is the success of these cities that will pull the train of success for the entire state.

Sunday, February 13, 2011

Buildings Do Not Create Jobs--Let's Cut the Rhetoric

It’s time we put an end to the political rhetoric that “buildings create jobs.” Companies create jobs and a building is but one of the three classical components of production, along with labor and capital. But it has become the norm in every announcement of a new commercial building for the government official and/or private developer to announce that the building of “One XYZ Place will create 100 construction jobs and 600 permanent jobs.” The claims are pernicious because it is often the rationale for government approval or public financing for the building and for public infrastructure expenditures (see Assembly Square link).


Buildings do not create jobs. Companies create jobs and then, as needed, assemble the factors of production necessary to produce a product or service. One of these factors of production is land, which, for our purposes, can be considered commercial space. The other factor is capital, such as the machinery necessary to manufacture a product or the telecom system necessary in a new office. The third and most important is labor.

To say that one factor of production—land (or commercial space) -- creates another factor of production—labor-- is not only theoretically wrong, it is absurd on the common sense level. A building is a box. If, and the” if” goes to the very core of commercial real estate, the building attracts a user, it will still be a box. It will not create the jobs; it will only house the jobs. And if the company leaves, it will not sprout new jobs. It will still be a box.

Buildings do not create construction jobs either. If the building is constructed by and for a specific user, the user, by creating the building, creates the construction jobs. If the building is constructed on a speculative basis, derived from an investor’s perception of the need for commercial space, then the construction jobs are created by the investor, not by the building. Again, the building is a box, just one factor of production.

One might argue that this is an issue of semantics. I beg to differ, because the “buildings create jobs” battle cry is used as a justification for virtually every new commercial construction project. If a private investor constructs an office building purely on the basis of its judgment of supply and demand and exactly within the zoning and building codes, I have no problem with semantics. Of course, this happens in the Land of Make Believe. Every office building constructed in Boston, even those meeting zoning and building codes, must still receive Boston Redevelopment Authority approval at the design level. And then the sensational claims come gushing out about buildings creating jobs. And then come the requests for public financing or incentives. And then the taxpayers start coughing up money based on an untruth. This is not an issue of semantics when semantics become a weapon of deceit.

The citizens of Massachusetts have now learned the issue the hard way, spelled E-V-E-R-G-R-E-E-N. Taxpayers paid for the building to the tune of $58 million in direct subsidies, incentives, and tax breaks. Evergreen created the jobs. And then Evergreen eliminated the jobs. The building is empty. It is not “creating jobs.” It is just a big empty box, which is all that it ever could be. It may once again become an active factor of production if a user chooses to produce a product or service in the box. But until then, the building will not be creating jobs.

Unfortunately, the Governor had already drunk the “buildings create jobs” Kool Aid, and his erstwhile development director, Greg Bialecki, is still handing out cups of the stuff all over the state. And we all keep drinking it. By the way, Mr. Bialecki considers Evergreen as a minor mistake. Makes you wonder what a major mistake would be.

If you want an idea how deeply entrenched this wishful thinking extends, simply visit the Boston Redevelopment Authority website, look up any development project, and read how many jobs the project will create. It’s a complete farce. I know a lot of landlords who wish that their existing half empty office buildings started to suddenly create jobs one day.

Saying a building creates jobs is like saying that making a hammer will create jobs. It leaves out the fact that hammers do not stand up, grab some nails, and start pounding away. A person (let’s call that person Mr. Labor) picks up the hammer first. And someone (let’s call that someone Mr. Producer) informs Mr. Labor what he wants him to do with the hammer. And, if we all hold our breath, maybe Mr. Producer will find his way to Fort Devens and rescue us all from the Evergreen debacle.

I’m a real estate broker. If buildings created jobs, my profession would not exist.

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

The Geography of Disaster: The LNG tanks of Everett, Massachusetts

While the Commonwealth continues to debate the wisdom of onshore LNG plants in Somerset and Fall River and while the populace cries foul at Cape Wind over price concerns, the Department of Energy recently and quietly painted a frightening picture of the onshore LNG industry. Liquefied natural gas, exposed to air or water, forms a pool of superheated, inextinguishable fire. Its burn rate depends on the amount of the spill, wind, waves, and currents. By its own assessment, the DoE, working in conjunction with the Sandia National Laboratory, estimated that a breach of only 3 of the 10 compartmentalized tanks on a typical LNG tanker would kill anyone within a ½ mile radius in less than 20 seconds. In 8 minutes, a breach would cause 2nd degree burns within a 2.5 mile radius.


Using Census Bureau and City of Boston estimates of workday populations under the 3 tank DoE scenario, over 80,000 people would die within 20 seconds with an additional 540,000 people suffering severe burns, many fatal, within 8 minutes. Within 12 minutes, fire would engulf all of Charlestown, East Boston, South Boston, the South End, the North End, North Station, Beacon Hill, the Back Bay, the West End and the towns of Chelsea, Everett, all of East Cambridge and over one half of Somerville.


Those are the aftermaths of breaches in tankers. The actual tanks at Everett, at equal if not greater risk of a similar breach, contain over 125,000,000 cubic meters of LNG, ten times the amount carried in a single ship.


There are 9 operating LNG plants in the United States. As the table below shows, Everett is the only plant located in a populated area and the only plant served by passage through a narrow, active harbor.


The Geography of Risk: The Relative Location of Existing Liquefied Natural Gas Plants in U.S.A.




Location of LNG Plants     Surrounding Area   Nearest Major City      Distance (miles)


Sabine, LA                         Island in lake              Shreveport                   72


Kenai, AK                       Port on Cook Inlet        Anchorage                    65


Freeport, TX                     Isolated bay                   Houston                      61


Cove Point, MD              Isolated riverfront      Washington DC               46


Cameron, LA                   Isolated bayou              Lake Charles                24
  
Lake Charles, LA            Island in lake               Lake Charles                 18


Peñuelas, PR                    Offshore ocean                Ponce                         7


Elba Island, GA       Unpopulated Island in river     Savannah                    6


Everett, MA            Heart of major city port            Boston                       1/4

Sunday, January 30, 2011

The Unpredictability Factor--The Myth of Telecommuting and the Growth of Central Cities

I never quite understood the appeal of working in my pajamas, although, evidently, the ability to do so makes one the member of an exalted class—the telecommuter. It’s all very George Jetson--like and it’s made folks like Steve Jobs very wealthy men. It’s also the topic of countless and generally boring visions of telecommuter nirvana where we are all in our pajamas looking out at the smog free home of the brave. The problem is it doesn’t work. Yes, jobs that have specific instruction and little deviation from the norm can be done in your home. They can also be done in India or Brazil. But you just can’t do much when the unexpected happens. The value of the American worker will be increasingly based on his or her ability to react to and deal with the unexpected and unpredictable world of global business. That’s tough to do in your jammies.


Let’s start with the latest rather startling evidence. The latest statistics from the Census Bureau indicate that office jobs have been growing at a faster pace in central cities than in their surrounding suburbs. Yes, the cities who our many experts told us 15 years ago would be virtually empty while we all sat and watched the grass grow in squat brick buildings in suburbia are outpacing the dull worlds surrounding them.

Considering that a suburban office worker is one step up the ladder from a telecommuter, things don’t bode well for the pajama party. Nor does it matter how many apps you’re running on your IPhone, because you can’t run an app for something that doesn’t yet exist, such as an unexpected visitor. It’s not difficult to see why suburban office use is on the relative decline. And it’s very easy to see why telecommuting rates have barely changed in 20 years. And it won’t change regardless of how much more of a toy we make our phones. It’s still a phone. Period.

I offer up the “unpredictability factor” as a new determinant in the location of the workforce. In short, the more unpredictable events that may occur in a given business day, the greater the necessity that the worker be located in or in close to a central city. And unpredictability has three components.

The first component is one of unexpected demand for services. Examples of the first would be commercial loan officers. Although one could argue that a loan officer can stay in his pajamas until the day and hour of his meeting, that would imply that every meeting must be a scheduled one. Not being in your office when a successful businessman wants to discuss a loan is not providing your core service. Other examples include real estate brokers, who must be ready for unexpected showings; attorneys who are unexpectedly called to court; and most public workers, who must be available for unexpected public business such as a marriage license. All of these workers possess the same qualities—the ability to deal with and react to new, unexpected business events.



The second component of unpredictability is the unexpected need for supplies or connections to provide the service. Examples from the unexpected supply side can be direct—an architect’s unexpected need for large scale renderings and a premium restaurant table for an out-of-town client unexpectedly in town for the night. They are more frequently indirect –the commercial loan officer’s need to meet with a rating service’s local representative about the creditworthiness of the unexpected seeker of the loan mentioned above.

The third component of unpredictability is the endless series and cycles of the unexpected meeting whether that be during a walk through the city, at a popular lunch spot, or while attending a seminar or lecture. This component is the one most cited by advocates of doing business in the city, and it is entirely one of making one’s presence known simply by being in the midst of your potential clients and vendors. As Woody Allen said, “80% of life is just showing up.”

It’s hard to accommodate the unexpected in your pajamas. And once you strip away the chic and false notion that an IPhone is somehow more than a phone, you can see that a telecommuter is the most replaceable of workers. By design, their work cannot deal with the live unexpected world of business on either the demand or the supply side. You don’t run in to many potential business partners in your kitchen. It’s nice to be able to email me a picture of your cousin’s new baby from your living room couch, but that’s not business.

A worker’s value in America is increasingly tied to his or her ability to deal with and respond vigorously to the unexpected. The closer a worker is to the central location of any geographic area makes that worker more capable of dealing with demand for and supply for unexpected business. It also dramatically increases the chance of the serendipitous meeting. The role of the telecommuter is to operate within dictated boundaries. But, of course, you get to wear your fluffy slippers at the same time.

Monday, December 27, 2010

For Every Love Letter Written, There's Another One Burned--A Little Balance Please

Banker & Tradesman’s lead article today was “Boston Tenants Vacate 1 M Square Feet in 2010.” A good grabber. And it’s even true. Gritty reading as Jim Cronin covered all of the properties that saw tenants pack up and go. He even got some respectable industry quotes. The problem is that his article was only half-a-story, as they say. What he forgot to cover or just plain overlooked is that more than 1 M Square Feet was occupied by fresh tenancies in 2010. Let’s get into the detail.

Banker & Tradesman (“B&T”) failed to balance off the vacancies to space that came to the market in 2010 with companies that did indeed, contrary to some of the article’s quoted sources, backfill the vacancies. Every good real estate researcher knows that backfilling takes place across markets, not within individual buildings. If B&T does not analyze the data this way, then B&T would be showing massive negative absorption in Boston of over 1 million in 2010. Every brokerage house and I have already noted positive absorption for the year. I will use B&T’s list first and then cover the properties they ignored.

1. International Place—Yes, when Ropes moved, nobody backfilled the space. But B&T failed to mention that Ropes’ move to 800 Boylston completely backfilled the vacancy left by the Gillette Company after its purchase by Procter & Gamble to the tune of 400,000 square feet.

2. One Federal—B&T is right on with this property. Between One Federal and 125 High, Tishman is sitting on the largest amount of space of any landlord in the city.

3. One Congress—I would not consider a converted garage to even be in inventory and thus not truly vacant. Under Tom O’Brien, the property is being marketed as future office space, and Tom is seeing a lot of interest.

4. 225 Franklin—This is B&T’s biggest mistake. Bank of America leased 226,000, followed shortly by Ameriprise Financial for 130,000 square feet. Along with 100 High, covered below, 225 Franklin was the success story of 2010. B&T’s numbers are completely wrong.

5. 99 High Street—How can B&T mention a vacancy increase without talking about the building’s largest tenant, KPMG, taking over 100,000 square feet to anchor Two Financial Center?

6. 53 State—Same question. The entirety of the vacancy at 53 State consists of Choate’s backfilling massive relocations out of Two International Place. The same will be true at 75 State when Wellington vacates 300,000 square feet there and at a handful of properties to anchor 500 Atlantic in a 400,000 square foot lease.

B&T missed the remarkable leasing efforts at 100 High Street—net 140,000 square feet slowly chipping away at what Bingham left behind; at 200 Clarendon led by the Bain Capital lease; and by way of Liberty Mutual’s expansion into 500 Boylston and its announcement of a new tower which will represent net growth. And many more pure growth stories.

B&T needs to make a choice—accurate net absorption figures or scary stories. You can’t have it both ways, no matter how much of a “grabber” it is.

Monday, December 13, 2010

What's Right about Boston's City Hall

It's my guess that about 95% of Bostonians would not mind if Boston City Hall were demolished tomorrow. About a year ago, the Mayor was so desparate to get out, he almost built a building in the ocean.

But the entire problem and the tremendous potential of the building is the landscape upon which it sits. Consider the State House (New State House, as a proper Bostonian would say.) If the building were built on the vast acreage that City Hall sits on, it would immediately lose its glory. City Hall is a majestic building. It is a city on a hill unto itself, but inverted. The problem is that nobody ever thought to bring the grandeur of City Hall itself to what could be the grand approaches to City Hall.

And I am not talking about the brick. I’m talking about bringing light and activity in concentric circles out from the base of City Hall. Doing so should have been simultaneous with the design of the building. Any building with an inverted base will naturally have a dark and shadowy base. Kallman et al forgot about this. As you approach City Hall, instead of looking up to see how the levels build upon each other, you look down into the pit of the entry. The lack of attention to light, a clear entry, and clear entry “flight paths,” if you will, defeat the architecture of the building. You feel like a mouse trying to find the hole into a massive hunk of cheese.

Grass is not the answer. It would be as unused as the brick plaza or the Dimway, oops Greenway, and would belittle the architecture itself. The answer to the context is varied, gentle elevations leading up into City Hall rather down into the pits. Imagine a series of ramparts approaching a castle except that along the ramparts we could build appropriately designed commercial, retail, and entertainment space—perfect space for an opera house which we embarrassingly do not have. But the approach must be up and toward the top of City Hall, not down and into the pit.

Back to the Old State House. How would you feel if there were McDonald’s bags on the lawn or plastic planes of glass in a few of the Governor’s office windows? The City has never taken care of City Hall. It is a disgrace. This is OUR building, and its care should be a matter of civic pride. The only response we manage to come up with is “tear it down, tear it down.” That’s fear speaking, not logic. About 10 years ago, the same crowd wanted to “re-clad” the Prudential Tower.

And all the architects who praise its design do that and nothing more. We are all wonderful critics and cynics, but few of us feel obligated to do anything. If the 1 million architects (that’s my estimate) who bobble around Boston and Cambridge want to bring life back to what, without dispute, is one of the country’s greatest examples of Brutalism, then they and we better look at the context of the property and the disgusting manner in which have let this property rot.

If we condemn City Hall to the wrecking ball, we condemn ourselves for a lack of will and imagination.

Friday, October 29, 2010

The Angry Man and the Guillotine

I like John Palmieri, the Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. He approaches development thoughtfully. His work at Seaport Square, Fan Pier, South Station, Liberty Mutual, and countless other development sites have been noteworthy and worth commending.


Unfortunately he works for the Angry Man. And after the latest self-induced debacle at the Filene’s site, the Angry Man, as is his custom, will be looking for any head to roll other than his own. Alas poor Yorick.

For two years, the Angry Man has been threatening Vornado and its partners at the Filene’s site with any combination of removal of permits to eminent domain. I wrote about the nonsense of such an approach on September 25, when the editors of the Globe started drinking the Angry Man‘s Kool Aid and demanding the same.

Fast forward one month and the Angry Man, using Mr. Palmieri the way President Bush used Colin Powell, had admitted that his approach was not thought out financially or procedurally.

I don’t want to beat a horse that’s not only dead but nearly buried, so let’s focus on how the Angry Man works. The Angry Man can never be wrong even when he is wrong. I didn’t hear any apologies for the money spent analyzing and developing renderings for a new City Hall in the unreachable docks of the easternmost piece of Boston Harbor. And you won’t hear any apologies for his nonsensical behavior with Vornado. His plea for help from Mayor Bloomberg was an embarrassment to Boston. His latest desire for unachievable vengeance on Messrs. Roth and Hynes is a further embarrassment.

This brings me back to Mr. Palmieri. The guillotine has been delivered to floor 9 at City Hall. And the Angry Man will pass the blame on again. Good luck John. Maybe intelligence and practicality will prevail at City Hall. But between Chiofaro and Vornado, the Angry Man needs to strike out at someone.

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Report on Massachusetts Home Sales is Not Accurate





Yesterday, most media sources reported that single family home sales had declined year over year in September. The Boston Globe chose to run this at the top of the business page with the ominous and incorrect title, “Mass. home sales dropped 12.9 percent last month.” The report was on existing single family homes and condominiums, not “homes.” I guess that’s the old-fashioned attention grabber.


The story was not technically incorrect. It was selectively correct. The Globe gave short shrift to pricing, which, if included as I do below, paint a very different picture.

As an example, suppose the lead article of the Globe Sports Section that same day discussed the previous night’s game against the Heat and covered all of the Celtics’ scoring but never mentioned the Heat. The title would read “Celtics Score 88 Points.” I don’t know about anyone else, but I think I might want to also know how many points the Heat scored so I could at least know who won the game. But that’s exactly the way the Globe played the news.

The correct approach would have incorporated both numbers of sales and pricing. Every industry measures its performance by GROSS REVENUE and GROSS PROFIT. Let’s look at the numbers in that light.

Gross home sales revenue in September 2010: 3,285 homes x $287,000 = $940,000 gross sales.

Gross home sales revenue in September 2009: 3,771 homes x $284,000 = $1,070,000 gross sales.

Gross single family home sales, expressed in revenue dollars, decreased by 8.3%, not by 12.9%. The same analysis of existing condominium sales results in a gross revenue decrease of 16.2%, not 21.5%.

Declines of 8% and 13% are certainly not comforting news, but they are a far cry from 13% and 22%. It’s not as bad as you think. When sales are declining while prices are increasing, that is simply the market at work constantly seeking market pricing.

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

While we're talking about the Green--I mean Dim-Way

So much bickering. So much wasted time and land. Here's a solution to the Dimway running up the City's gut.

BUILD ON IT. NOT AROUND IT. ON IT. I've studied what every parcel can bear. Insure the use is open to the public but not free. Stop thinking of the long monotonous strip as an oasis. It isn't. And we have one called the Common, among others.


Think of it as a cultural playground. Begin by building a raised, glorious Opera House right in front of One Financial Center in the vast wasteland of Dewey Square.

Go from there.

Innovation District??

I don't know where to begin. Should we rewind to Mayor Menino in 1999 and again in 2002 and 2003 declaring the "Seaport" as the "New Boston" for high rise office and luxury reidential development "on a scale not seen since the Back Bay?"


Do we need yet another planner, this time the dubious Kairos Shen of the BRA, still wondering why nobody wants to build 12 story buildings along the Dimway?

Does anyone really believe that Joe Fallon wants to see his Fan Pier propertiesl filled by startups looking for "cheaper rent than Cambridge?"

Nobody's paying rent on the 14th floor of a new high rise on the harbor and the frustrated Mayor wants us to believe that kids playing with helium baloons while paying no rent constitute a good trend?

This is not unlike bad sports teams who change their uniform design every year hoping the fans won't notice that nothing has changed.

There are industries well suited for the east portion of the area. North Coast Seafoods is an excellent example. As is Massport.

With patience in what is already a recovering office market, office tenants like Fish & Richardson, who actually pay Joe rent, will come.

In the meantime, let's not assuage the Mayor's unlimited need for instant gratification by allowing him to generate more nonsense. I do believe the same Mayor wanted to move City Hall to this new Innovation District. Even he couldn't silent enough critics on the utter lack of a shred of sense in that brainstorm.

The Mayor's lack of inagination and reality has already killed the Dimway over a personal vendetta. Next thing we know he'll have his driver roaming up and down A Street demanding the buildings have crowns.

The newest business to open in the Innovation District is "Whisky Priest" on Northern Avenue right across from the Seaport Hotel.